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     Law Review 
[Re]Integrating Community Space: The Legal and 
Social Meanings of Reclaiming Abandoned Space 
in New York’s Lower East Side 
Andrea McArdle* 
 
What understandings about property, the community concerns informing it, 
and the legal relationships that flow from it can we draw from a city’s buildings 
and spaces? What contending values and expectations underpin laws that 
concomitantly protect property interests and seek to advance public safety, 
health, and economic well-being in urban neighborhoods? What explanatory 
narratives can advocates, analysts, and policymakers discern from such laws? If, 
as Jane Jacobs might attest, a city’s “buildings and streetscapes encapsulate[] 
information” that engages its viewers and users,1 these forms contribute to the 
meaning we derive from city spaces.  
This Article argues that the meaning we can draw from these buildings and 
streetscapes as they have been constructed, abandoned, or refashioned over time 
is complex and multifaceted. Using New York City’s Lower East Side landscape 
as exemplary text, the Article identifies various narratives of regulatory burden, 
scarcity, abandonment, transgression, and renewal that recur in the discourse of 
property law, and it considers ways in which local government institutions 
contribute to the shape of those narratives as regulators, service providers, and 
owners of property. 
The Article begins with a brief account of conditions in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s that contributed to public and private disinvestment in the storied 
Lower East Side, a site of intense immigrant settlement at the turn of the 
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1 The quotation is part of a set of reflections on urbanist Jane Jacobs’ 
penchant for drawing meaning from a city’s buildings and infrastructure. See 
Robert Sirman, Built Form and the Metaphor of Storytelling, in What We See: 
Advancing the Observations of Jane Jacobs 159, 161 (2010). 
 





twentieth century,2 and, in the 1950s and 1960s, a space that attracted writers, 
artists, and political activists. 3  Public disinvestment in local communities 
resulted from New York’s fiscal crisis and its inability to maintain previous 
levels of municipal services.4 Private disinvestment entailed owners’ exploitation 
and failure to maintain their properties, which was often followed by tax 
delinquencies and foreclosures, abandonment, or arson.5  The Article then 
addresses how these conditions also afforded an opportunity for reclaiming 
devalued land and distressed neighborhoods. Beginning in the mid-1970s, 
neighborhood-initiated cultivation of gardens in vacant, burnt-out lots6 and 
homesteading occupants’ refurbishing of buildings that had fallen into disrepair7 
created a new source of investment in city-owned property, holding out the 
promise of community stabilization.   
This Article examines the legal implications of these autonomous, self-help 
responses to disinvestment. Initially, the City supported and legitimized 
community gardeners’ and homesteaders’ efforts at reclamation.8 However, 
when land values rose in the 1980s and 1990s, the City reversed course and 
invoked laws limiting access to property as the City sought to auction off 
community gardens that operated under revocable licenses 9  and to evict 
homesteaders as trespassers.10 In response, local residents also invoked law’s 
authority. Gardeners sought redress under legal theories alleging violations of 
environmental law and civil rights.11 Squatters and homesteaders asserted rights 
as adverse possessors.12 Although these legal claims proved unavailing, by 2002, 
agreements negotiated on behalf of these claimants permanently protected some 
community gardens from development 13  and afforded occupants of eleven 
                                                 
2 Christopher Mele, Selling the Lower East Side: 
Culture, Real Estate, and Resistance in New York City 45 
(2000); Janet L. Abu-Lughod, Introduction to From Urban Village to 
East Village: The Battle for New York’s Lower East Side 1, 4 
(Janet L. Abu-Lughod ed., 1994). 
3 Mele, supra note 2, at 140-45, 158-66. 
4 Id. at 190-91; see also William K. Tabb, The Long Default: New 
York City and the Urban Fiscal Crisis 30-35 (1982). 
5 Neil Smith, Betsy Duncan & Laura Reid, From Disinvestment to 
Reinvestment: Mapping the Urban ‘Frontier’ on the Lower East Side, in From 
Urban Village to East Village: The Battle for New York’s 
Lower East Side 149, 149-52 (Janet L. Abu-Lughod ed., 1994); see also 
Mele, supra note 2, at 191-200. 
6 Mele, supra note 2, at 208, 210; Robert Fox Elder, Protecting New York 
City’s Community Gardens, 13 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 769, 773-76 (2005). 
7 Mele, supra note 2, at 204-11. 
8 Id. at 210-11. 
9 Elder, supra note 6, at 776-77. 
10 Mele, supra note 2, at 273-76, 299-301. 
11 Elder, supra note 6, at 777-83. 
12 Thomas J. Lueck, Police Evict Squatters from Three City-Owned Tenements 
in the East Village, N.Y. Times (Aug. 14, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1996/08/14/nyregion/police-evict-squatters-from-three-city-owned-tenements-
in-the-east-village.html. 
13 Elder, supra note 6, at 785-88. 





squatted buildings a new legal status as shareholders of limited-equity 
cooperative housing.14  
Drawing on these developments, this Article addresses how such 
community efforts to reengage with threatened urban landscapes generate legal 
meaning. It discusses how the recently opened Museum of Reclaimed Urban 
Space (MORUS), which is literally built into a formerly squatted building in 
New York’s Lower East Side,15 both portrays and adds to that meaning-making. 
By illuminating the particular ways in which the owners and users of these 
contested spaces invoked both property law and community norms, MORUS 
documents how the squatter and community garden movements helped 
reintegrate distressed city buildings and lots as community spaces.  The Article 
concludes with reflection on the continued work of MORUS to demonstrate how 
the impulse to reclaim space also inevitably transforms it.  
I. The Narrative of Property at Risk: Public and Private Disinvestment 
By the early 1970s, New York and most cities in the northeastern and 
midwestern United States had suffered a severe decline in their manufacturing 
sectors, which relocated mainly to nonunionized and less heavily regulated 
jurisdictions in the American South and offshore.16 The resulting reductions in 
New York City’s tax base and employment levels placed pressure on City 
residents’ ability to pay for housing and challenged the City’s capacity to meet 
its day-to-day operating expenses. Property owners, particularly in lower-income 
neighborhoods, responded in part by disinvestment—a deliberate set of 
behaviors, including a failure to pay taxes or make debt payments, to make 
needed repairs, or to deliver basic services such as providing heat.17 
The dynamics of ownership, investment, and disinvestment in residential 
property in New York City includes a longstanding system of rent regulation, 
which places limits on what landlords may charge for multifamily housing.18 
Originating in housing shortages during World War II and the immediate post-
war period, rent regulation initially consisted of rent control, which covered 
properties built before February 1947.19 The scope of this regulation was 
augmented by the enactment in 1969 of a rent stabilization law that principally 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., Paula Crossfield, Sweat Equity Pays Off, The Brooklyn Rail 
(Nov. 2, 2006), http://www.brooklynrail.org/2006/11/streets/sweat-equity-
pays-off; Bullet Space is the First of the Former LES Squats to Take Over 
Ownership of Building from City, EV Grieve (May 12, 2009, 7:00 AM), 
http://www.evgrieve.com/2009/05/bullet-space-is-first-of-former-les.html. 
15 Colin Moynihan, Sharing a Part of Activist History in the East Village, 
N.Y. Times (Mar. 4, 2012, 3:14 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/05/ 
nyregion/east-village-museum-shares-a-piece-of-activist-history.html?ref= 
nyregion. 
16 Mele, supra note 2, at 126-29; Tabb, supra note 4, at 71-77; Abu-
Lughod, supra note 2, at 1-2. 
17 Smith et al., supra note 5, at 149-52. 
18 Introduction, N.Y. St. Homes & Cmty. Renewal, http://www. 
nyshcr.org/Rent/about.htm#intro (last visited July 24, 2014).  
19 Id.  





applied to rental housing of six or more units completed after February 1, 1947, 
and before January 1, 1974.20  
The expanding landscape of rent regulation was, in turn, blamed for 
property owners’ declining revenues and declining willingness to invest in rental 
properties,21 although it seems equally likely that these landlords’ decisions to 
disinvest in rental properties may have been driven by the existence of other, 
higher-yielding investment options.22 In 1971, the perception of burdensome 
property regulation was inscribed in law when the New York State legislature 
enacted the Urstadt Law,23 a measure that restricted the City’s authority to 
strengthen existing rental regulations or to extend them to unregulated 
properties.24 In the words of New York State’s high court, this legislation was 
intended to “encourage owners to invest in the maintenance and improvement 
of existing housing units and thereby help to stem the tide of abandonment of 
sound buildings in the City.”25 
The Urstadt Law accounted for the challenges of property ownership in 
terms of the impact of rent regulation on the revenues that an owner could 
realize from investing in property. By 1974, however, it was clear that the 
economics of property ownership in New York City was more complicated than 
a regulatory-burden explanation would suggest, as it was exacerbated by 
developments beyond the confines of New York City and even New York 
State.26 At that time, the national economy was in a recession, triggered by 
adverse changes in the position of the U.S. dollar in international trade and 
precipitous increases in the price of oil imported from the Middle East.27 These 
developments impacted New York City through an increase in unemployment 
levels tied to a plummeting of manufacturing jobs, which, in turn, increased the 
need for services and also created a downturn in the real estate sector that 
eventually resulted in tax arrears causing a loss of City revenues.28  
These developments led to further deterioration of neighborhoods, 
particularly those housing less-resourced residents, and reinforced patterns of 
disinvestment in residential buildings among landlords already disinclined to 
                                                 
20 Id. In addition, tenants in New York City buildings completed before 
February 1, 1947, but who began residency after June 30, 1971, are covered 
under rent stabilization regulations, as are buildings with three or more 
residential units that were built or substantially renovated on or after January 1, 
1974, with “special” designated tax benefits. Id. Buildings receiving these tax 
benefits usually remain under regulation while the benefits are in effect, or, in 
some instances, until the tenant terminates the tenancy. Id..   
21 Tabb, supra note 4, at 90-91. 
22 Id. at 89 (noting rising interest rates and gentrification). 
23 N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 8605 (McKinney 2014).  
24 Id. at 1. 
25 In re KSLM-Columbus Apts., Inc. v. New York State Div. of Hous. & 
Cmty Renewal, 835 N.E.2d 643, 648 (2005) (quoting City of New York v. New 
York State Div. of Hous. & Cmty Renewal, 765 N.E.2d 829,835 (2001)). 
26 Abu-Lughod, supra note 2, at 1. 
27 Abu-Lughod, supra note 2, at 1-2. 
28 Id. at 2. 





maintain their properties.29 The buildup of tax arrears eventually led to tax 
foreclosures that brought properties under City ownership.30 Other buildings 
were abandoned by landlords who concluded that it was not profitable to invest 
resources in them.31 A number of these properties were destroyed or badly 
damaged as a result of arson—an outcome perhaps also connected to the 
perceived lack of profitability.32  By the mid-1970s, the City increasingly held the 
unsought status of property owner but lacked the wherewithal or the inclination 
to maintain the ravaged lots and the abandoned or tax-foreclosed properties that 
had fallen under its ownership.33  
As revenue losses exceeded the City’s burgeoning expenses, the City 
incurred an increasing level of short-term debt to make up for these shortfalls. In 
late 1974, the City held 29% of total short-term notes issued in the United States, 
and by 1975, the City’s short-term debt constituted 36.9% of its total debt.34 
Moreover, the City’s ability to borrow had become tied in part to questionable 
budgetary practices based on overly generous, though unrealistic, revenue 
estimates and invasion of its capital reserves to pay ongoing operating expenses.35  
As the investment sector became uneasy with the City’s approach to borrowing 
and spending, investment banks began decreasing their holdings of City bonds.36 
By the summer of 1975, it was widely believed that the City was “sliding toward 
bankruptcy.”37  
These conditions triggered New York State and federal measures in the 
second half of 1975, which placed unprecedented strictures on the City’s 
finances. The State measures comprised: the Municipal Assistance Corporation 
(MAC), a public entity that issued short-term bonds on behalf of the City;38 the 
Emergency Financial Control Board, which assumed control of the City’s 
budgeting, borrowing, and spending for a three-year period;39 the short-lived 
Moratorium Act, which permitted the City to delay paying—and to lower the 
amount of interest due—on its short-term notes;40 and a tax package that 
increased City and State taxes.41 This new stringency also entailed the City’s 
laying off workers, reducing services, raising transit fares,42 charging increased 
                                                 
29 Id. 
30 Smith et al., supra note 5, at 153-55. 
31 Mele, supra note 2, at 191-200. 
32 Id. at 192-93; Tabb, supra note 4, at 94-96. 
33 Mele, supra note 2, at 200. 
34 Seymour P. Lachman & Robert Polner, The Man Who 
Saved New York: Hugh Carey and the Great Fiscal Crisis of 
1975 104 (2010). 
35 Lachman & Polner, supra note 34, at 112; Tabb, supra note 4, at 23-
24. 
36 Lachman & Polner, supra note 34, at 104-05. 
37 Id. at 113. 
38 Id. at 114-15. 
39 Id. at 129. 
40 Id. at 162. 
41 Id. at 163. 
42 Tabb, supra note 4, at 34-35. 





fees and eventually tuition at the formerly free City University of New York,43 
and the commitment of the City’s five municipal unions to invest pension funds 
in MAC-issued debt.44 After initial resistance and a prominent public scolding of 
the City’s failure to rein in spending,45 in December 1975, President Gerald Ford 
signed legislation that authorized seasonal federal loans. This measure enabled 
the City to avoid shortfalls resulting from time lags in revenue collections vis-à-
vis when obligations became due.46              
This regime of restructuring responded to, and also reinforced, a dominant 
narrative of City profligacy, swollen government, excessive union leverage, and a 
failed capacity to make the difficult choices that would be required to bring 
spending in line with revenues.47 Nonetheless, within City government and 
among municipal unions, a counter-narrative resonated: the investment banks 
had precipitated the fiscal crisis by selling off their holdings of City notes, which, 
in turn, contributed to a perception that the securities issued by or on behalf of 
the City were unsound and an unacceptable investment risk.48 This narrative 
implied that the banks had pressed for a resolution that privileged investors’ 
financial well-being over the needs of the City’s more vulnerable populations.49 
Of these contending understandings of property—and of whose property most 
mattered—the banking sector’s theme of fiscal discipline over City recalcitrance 
acquired more traction.50 
The City’s retrenchment continued with the election of Mayor Edward 
Koch in 1977. A second round of discussions with federal officials led to the New 
York City Loan Guarantee Act of 1978,51 which was needed to contain the 
continuing risk of default.52 Municipal unions were again asked to invest a 
significant portion of pension funds into municipal bonds and notes. 53 
Reductions in municipal services were extensive,54 particularly in the City’s less-
resourced neighborhoods, where private disinvestment and abandonment were 
also ongoing.55 Under these conditions, members of disenfranchised, disinvested 
communities in the City resorted to an alternative investment strategy: self-help. 
                                                 
43 Id. at 49-53. 
44 Lachman & Polner, supra note 34, at 132-33, 163-64. 
45 Id. at 109-10. 
46 Id. at 164-65. 
47 See Tabb, supra note 4, at 31-33, 59-66; see also Lachman & Polner, 
supra note 34, at 109-10, 128-32. 
48 Tabb, supra note 4, at 24-25. 
49 Id. at 25. 
50 Id. at 35. 
51 Id. at 32; see also New York City Loan Guarantee Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 
95-339, 92 Stat. 460. 
52 Tabb, supra note 4, at 31-32. 
53 Id. at 32. 
54 Lachman & Polner, supra note 34, at 130. 
55 Mele, supra note 2, at 212. 





II. New Investment: Reclaiming Property through Community Sweat Equity 
Strait-jacketed by continuing revenue shortfalls and the austerity regime 
imposed by New York State, the federal government, and the investment sector, 
the City relied on its enterprising residents to reinvest in the deteriorating built 
environment, principally through their own labor. In the late 1970s, the City 
launched programs that permitted homesteading under the auspices of the 
Division of Alternative Management Program (DAMP), thus supporting a 
tenant’s capacity to rehabilitate and assume a cooperative ownership interest in 
formerly City–owned buildings.56 Non-profit organizations such as the Urban 
Homesteading Assistance Board (UHAB) and Adopt-a-Building helped these 
homesteaders acquire the skills needed to manage real estate.57 Homesteaders’ 
status typically was distinguished from that of squatters because squatters 
occupied buildings without the authorization of the City.58 Before the real estate 
sector began to reinvest in the Lower East Side in the 1980s, however, squatters 
who occupied property and took some steps to improve it generally were allowed 
to remain.59  
Relatedly, the squalid conditions accompanying private and public 
disinvestment in the 1970s left vacant lots as eyesores and spurred community 
residents to initiate another form of sweat equity: cultivating and converting the 
lots into verdant, vegetation-filled oases. The gardens contributed needed green 
space, enhanced the appearance of neighborhoods, and furnished communities 
with gathering places for residents beleaguered by the combined effects of 
physical deterioration and crime.60  Community-based organizations such as 
Green Guerrillas supported the launch of gardens, 61 and, since 1978, the City has 
provided technical support and advice through the GreenThumb licensing 
program,62 a program that sanctions community efforts to occupy and use City-
owned land until the City designates its intention to develop a site.63 
                                                 
56 Id. at 206-07. 
57 Id. An early example was 519 East Eleventh Street on the Lower East 
Side, a building that had been abandoned and damaged by arson, and located 
along a street dubbed Stripper’s Row, where stripping cars was a nightly 
pastime. Shayla Love, The Almost Forgotten Story of the 1970s East Village 
Windmill, Gothamist (Sept. 20, 2014, 10:55 AM), 
http://gothamist.com/2014/09/29/east_village_windmill_nyc.php#photo-1. 
Armed with a low-cost loan and funding under the Comprehensive Employment 
and Training Act to compensate (partly) and train residents in building 
construction skills, the newly formed UHAB offered the route to residents’ 
eventual apartment ownership, which also entailed their investing hours of 
“sweat equity.” Id. 
58 Mele, supra note 2, at 207.  
59 See id.  
60 Id. at 208, 210. 
61 Elder, supra note 6, at 775.  
62 Id. at 776-77. 
63 See, e.g., N.Y.C. Envtl. Justice Alliance v. Giuliani, 50 F. Supp. 2d 250, 
252 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (denying a motion to enjoin City from auctioning off 
parcels of land containing 600 community gardens) (discussed in Elder, supra 
note 6, at 781-85); cf. Memorandum of Agreement between the State of New 





By these largely self-help efforts during the City’s fiscal crisis, the 
homesteaders, squatters, and gardeners signaled their intention to invest in the 
devastated spaces of their neighborhoods and reintegrate them as community 
spaces. These affirmative acts should also be understood as a form of resistance, 
a way of returning disinvested properties to their communities.64  In this sense, 
those engaging in sweat equity not only sought to realize personal goals to have a 
plot of land or a patch of earth to till, but also sought to reclaim for their 
communities the buildings and spaces lost as a consequence of disinvestment.65 
In the late 1970s, when the City was under the yoke of the Emergency 
Financial Control Board and the real estate sector had not yet reawakened 
interest in the Lower East Side, the fiscal logic of permitting and promoting 
homesteading, squatting, and community gardening seemed clear. The City both 
helped preserve these buildings and spaces from further deterioration and 
facilitated community-based initiatives without incurring substantial expenses 
itself. When the City’s fiscal pressures eased and real estate interests sought to 
redevelop the Lower East Side, the City wavered in its support for these 
programs.66 Community members who offered their labor to improve dilapidated 
City-owned spaces no longer could assume that they held a legitimate status.67 
Instead, the City sought to evict the occupants of squatted and homesteaded 
buildings and sell off the buildings as well as the garden lots.68  
The City’s shift in position triggered a range of responses, from civil 
disobedience to litigation.69 The City advanced affirmative claims during these 
legal skirmishes that centered on traditional understandings of a property 
owner’s right to exclude,70 and its corollary, that those to be excluded were 
either trespassers or otherwise subject to the withdrawal at will of any existing 
rights to possess or use City property. Those challenging the City developed 
                                                                                                             
York and the City of New York regarding the GreenThumb Program, §§ 4-6 
(Sept. 17, 2002), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/community_ 
gardens_agreement.pdf (compromise immunizing some New York City garden 
lots from development) (discussed in Elder, supra note 6, at 786-87). 
64 Mele, supra note 2, at 210; Alan W. Moore, The Opening of the MORUS 
Museum Was an Unexpected Surprise, in Museum of Reclaimed Urban 
Space Opening —A Moment’s Catalog December 8, 2012, 6a-b 
(Benjamin Shepard ed., 2013). 
65 Mele, supra note 2, at 210. 
66 Id. at 210-11; see also William Sites, Public Action: New York City Policy 
and the Gentrification of the Lower East Side, in From Urban Village to 
East Village: The Battle for New York’s Lower East Side 
189, 200-01 (Janet L. Abu-Lughod ed., 1994). 
67 See Mele, supra note 2, at 240-41. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 260-62. 
70 See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 509 (1990) 
(Mosk, J., dissenting) (“[T]he concept of property is often said to refer to a 
‘bundle of rights’ . . . principally the rights to possess the property, to use the 
property, to exclude others from the property, and to dispose of the property by 
sale or by gift.”).  





theories of individual rights rooted in community-based interests, which courts 
struggled with and typically rejected. 
III. Legal Maneuvers and Legal Narratives: Theorizing Community Investment 
When, by the 1990s, land values in the Lower East Side escalated to the 
point of fully engaging developers’ interests, the mayoral administration of 
Rudolph Giuliani redoubled efforts to remove the occupants from the not-fully-
livable structures that nonetheless functioned as home for some.71 And during 
these same years, the City first stopped issuing new GreenThumb licenses to 
City lot gardeners, then denied renewal requests for expired licenses,72 and 
began selling the lots at auction to developers, in many cases for the purpose of 
building affordable housing.73 By the late 1990s, three lawsuits asserting a range 
of theories and narratives for understanding the community value of garden 
space helped shape the meaning that litigants, lawyers, and legal institutions 
could draw from the auctions.74 These lawsuits illustrate the challenges when 
two vital urban aims are in tension: providing affordable housing and promoting 
preservation of green space in neighborhoods previously lacking such benefits.75 
A. Situating Community Gardens and Community Interests in a Legal 
Framework 
A lawsuit challenging the withdrawal of garden lots from the Lower East 
Side and other City neighborhoods was brought by a local organization asserting 
interests that reflected the meaning derived from the use value of the abandoned 
lots to the gardeners. In In re New York City Coalition for the Preservation of 
Gardens v. Giuliani,76 plaintiffs argued that the City was required to subject 
proposed construction of moderate- and middle-income cooperative and 
condominium housing units on the garden sites to environmental review under 
New York State and municipal laws before releasing the lots for sale to 
developers.77 The court drew on conventional property-related concepts and 
concluded that the challengers lacked standing—either because they were 
gardening without a license or gardening with a GreenThumb license that was 
expressly revocable.78  
                                                 
71 Mele, supra note 2, at 299. 
72 Elder, supra note 6, at 776-77. 
73 Id. at 777; see e.g., In re N.Y.C. Coal. for the Pres. of Gardens v. Giuliani, 
670 N.Y.S.2d 654 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997); N.Y.C. Envtl. Justice Alliance v. 
Guiliani, 50 F. Supp. 2d 250, 251-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); N.Y.C. Envtl. Justice 
Alliance v. Giuliani, 214 F.3d 65, 68-70 (2d Cir. 2000) (cited in Elder, supra 
note 6, at 777-85). 
74 Elder, supra note 6, at 777-85 (addressing this tension and describing the 
cases).  
75 Id. 
76 670 N.Y.S.2d 654 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 1997) (cited in Elder, supra note 6, at 
777-85). 
77 In re N.Y.C. Coal. for the Pres. of Gardens, 670 N.Y.S.2d at 657-58. 
78 Id. at 659. 





Nonetheless, the court went on to address the merits of their challenge, 
interpreting the statutes at issue to permit exemption of the new construction 
from environmental review on the understanding that the new structures would 
replace a preexisting use.79 It specifically rejected the contention that the 
intervening use of the lots as gardens disqualified the proposed construction as 
replacement housing and similarly disregarded the plaintiffs’ point that the 
gardened lots were not in fact “vacant,” as they had been classified by City 
housing officials.80 In the court’s view, these uses were, at best, “temporary,” 
and, in some cases, unlicensed interruptions of a preexisting use.81 Turning to a 
separate claim under the General Municipal Law, the court noted the imperative 
of returning a “neighborhood as quickly and economically as possible to its 
original character.”82 For the court, then, the use of the lots as gardens by 
predominantly low-income communities of color had no independent legal 
meaning.83  
A subsequent lawsuit brought by the New York City Environmental Justice 
Alliance challenged the sale of gardens that would make way for affordable and 
market-rate housing, senior care facilities, and some commercial space.84 Here, 
plaintiffs developed a potentially more promising theory that eschewed property 
concepts in favor of a federal civil rights paradigm.85 The complaint alleged that 
the auctioning of gardens violated community members’ rights under federal 
regulations adopted to implement Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196486 
Specifically, these regulations barred use of methods in implementing a program 
that would have a discriminatory effect on the basis of race, color, national 
origin, or sex.87  
Ruling on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the District Court for the 
Southern District of New York concluded that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed 
on the merits, in part because they lacked clear authority to bring a private right 
of action.88 Affirming, the Second Circuit principally focused on the absence of 
sufficient evidence that the closing of gardens caused a disparate adverse effect 
on persons of color living nearby.89 The court’s emphasis on the failure of proof 
of racial discrimination invites consideration whether the court might have 
accepted an environmentally framed racial injustice narrative if supported with 
adequate evidence. Such a narrative might have achieved greater legal resonance 
than one based on property use and environmental regulation, since 
                                                 
79 Id. at 660-61.  
80 Id. at 659-61. 
81 Id. at 660-61. 
82 Id. at 661 (cited in Elder, supra note 6, at 777-85). 
83 Id. at 665. 
84 N.Y.C. Envtl. Justice Alliance, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 251-52 (cited in Elder, 
supra note 6, at 781-83). 
85 Id. at 252-53. 
86 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988). 
87 N.Y.C. Envtl. Justice Alliance, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 252-53.  
88 Id. at 252, 255. 
89 N.Y.C. Envtl. Justice Alliance, 214 F.3d at 68-70. 





understandings about property rights and their limitations have accrued and 
solidified over time, whereas civil rights jurisprudence continues to evolve.90    
The third suit, initiated in 1999 by then New York State Attorney General 
Eliot Spitzer, returned to a theory based on environmental protection claims to 
challenge the sale of the garden lots, which the State was authorized to 
vindicate.91 The complaint also sought to re-categorize older gardens as parkland 
under New York State law, which would insulate them from sale to developers.92 
This use of property-preserving concepts to protect community assets pointed to 
the possibility of aligning the values underpinning property and community.93 
This lawsuit was settled in 2002, at the dawn of a new mayoral administration. 
The State and the City of New York agreed to protect some gardens 
permanently, and allowed others to remain available for development after sites 
undergo an environmental impact review and a garden review process to help 
gardeners locate alternate sites, if available.94 
B. Self-Help and the Law: The Shifting Legal Status of Homesteading and 
Squatting 
As it had done in response to community gardens, the City in the mid-to-
late-1970s supported homesteading programs that substituted tenants’ sweat 
equity for the City’s investments of its resources in the casualties of the fiscal 
crisis.95 In those years before New York City land values had recovered, the 
burnt-out shells of residential buildings became laboratories for shared living, 
and self-help, and, on one occasion, the site of ingenious experiments in 
alternative energy, including a windmill that supplied electricity to a 
homesteaded building at 519 East Eleventh Street on the Lower East Side.96   
These experiments raised property issues, but perhaps the most impactful 
legal challenge faced by the early homesteaders did not emanate from the City. 
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Rather, the building’s generation of electricity prompted a lawsuit by the local 
investor-owned utility, Consolidated Edison, for in effect occupying its power 
grid97—infringing on a core property concept of exclusive control.98 Ultimately, 
this unique application of wind power was approved by New York State’s Public 
Service Commission and vindicated by the federal government as a precedent for 
the principle of cogeneration in the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 
1978,99 which required utilities to purchase electric power from entities capable 
of producing power at a lower cost than that of the utility.100 
During this era, the Urban Homesteading Assistance Board began working 
on the City’s then-devastated housing stock, in initiatives that it currently 
carries out under the auspices of the Tenant Interim Leasing program: these 
programs entail training residents in City-owned properties in building 
management and self-governance, and converting the buildings into limited-
equity cooperatives for a modest investment by the residents.101 Other occupants 
of City-owned buildings who were not participating in the early homesteading 
programs, although similarly animated by the values of self-help and community 
control of abandoned spaces,102 remained essentially squatters; they faced a more 
precarious legal status, especially after the City withdrew its involvement in 
homesteading programs.  
Increasingly, occupants of squatted buildings offered a highly critical 
perspective about urban housing policy. Beginning in the latter half of the 1980s, 
some squatters saw themselves as part of a broader movement advocating for 
access to low-income housing beyond their own individual needs.103 They also 
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faced more sustained removal efforts as the City in the late 1980s and 1990s 
began regularly to pursue evictions and demolitions of purportedly unsafe and 
“vacant” buildings to facilitate the sale of the lots to developers.104 In response, 
some squatters became identified with obstructionist protest tactics, ranging 
from pitching rocks and eggs to launching M-80 explosives,105 while others opted 
for absurdist behavior calculated to generate media attention. 106  In one 
celebrated incident, a number of squatter activists opened bags that contained 
thousands of crickets during an auction for garden lots and a parcel housing 
Charas, a cherished community center also slated for development.107 
A heavily publicized example of the City’s enforcement efforts occurred in 
the mid-1990s, as tenants in five buildings on the Lower East Side’s East 
Thirteenth Street asserted a right to remain on the property under an adverse 
possession theory—long-term, open, continuous occupancy of property owned 
of record by another.108 After the City won the right to evict tenants from two of 
the buildings in 1995, it famously enforced the order, amid resistance and efforts 
at obstructionism, with a heavy police presence and an armored personnel 
carrier.109 That vehicle has become an iconic reminder of the intensity of a 
dispute involving contending theories of the basis of the right to occupy and use 
land.110 In 1996, the occupants of the three other buildings were also evicted; 
they were unable to meet the requirements of adverse possession111 under an 
arguably more tenant-favorable interpretation of the law prevailing at that 
time,112 a version that the New York State Legislature has since amended to 
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require a showing of a “reasonable basis” for a belief that property belongs to the 
adverse possessor.113 
In their study of “property outlaws,” Eduardo Moises Peñalver and Sonya 
Katyal argue that deliberate law breaking, such as squatting, often is the response 
of those with limited resources, and can serve both an “acquisitive” goal—
acquiring something that the lawbreaker lacks—or an “expressive” purpose—
focusing attention on a failing or unfairness in the law.114 Therefore, deliberate 
law breaking can exert pressure on rules, including their manner of 
interpretation and enforcement, and in this sense, contribute to property law’s 
capacity to evolve.115 Considered in relation to this framework, squatting on the 
Lower East Side demonstrated both aspects of intentional law breaking: 
squatters occupy and appropriate real property owned by another, generally the 
City, and squatting became increasingly associated with a radical critique of the 
lack of affordable housing in the City, as well as with unorthodox oppositionist 
tactics.116 Squatters’ motivations in the late 1980s and 1990s for actively resisting 
the City’s efforts to remove them seemed to encompass both a response to their 
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individual plight and a more general critique of City policies and practices, 
although these motivations were perhaps difficult to disentangle.117 
If the legal status of Lower East Side’s squatters shifted from homesteaders 
in the 1970s to outlaws, transgressors against property, as well as perhaps social 
propriety in the 1990s,118 the status of many Lower East Side squatters changed 
again in 2002.  The new administration of Mayor Michael Bloomberg carried 
forward a surprise reversal in policy by outgoing Mayor Rudolph Giuliani119 by 
entering into an agreement with the Urban Homesteading Assistance Board 
(UHAB). 120  By the agreement’s terms, UHAB purchased eleven squatted 
buildings from the City for one dollar each, arranged for financing to bring the 
buildings into code compliance, and helped residents of each building form a 
cooperative association (a housing development fund company)121 as a vehicle for 
self-governance and limited-equity apartment ownership for a modest purchase 
amount—$250—122 with the support of a property tax exemption, and with 
limits on the resale price.123 
For the former squatters, the legal meaning of the agreement seems clear: by 
the stroke of a pen, the accord transformed them from trespassers—property 
outlaws—to co-op shareholders and, in effect, apartment owners. At the same 
time, the legal import of these arrangements has produced some ambivalence; 
although the agreement with the City secured affordable housing for individuals 
whose situation had long been legally vulnerable, the financial terms of the 
construction loan repayment for which they are legally responsible might prove 
onerous. Specifically, these arrangements have led to charges of mismanagement 
and delay against UHAB, some refinancing of these loans, and even an effort to 
assert adverse possession on a building-wide basis.124 The restrictions on resale 
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price have also generated complaints resulting in some upward adjustments, as 
objecting residents pointed to the market value added to the buildings over the 
years through their own labor.125 The social meaning of the squatters’ new status 
may be similarly nuanced; the unconventional and more radicalized dimensions 
of life that a number of the Lower East Side squatters had famously pursued 
might seem compromised, or perhaps too domesticated by the new 
arrangements. 
Although differences over the extent and exchange value of individual sweat 
equity investments have divided a number of the buildings’ residents, the 
agreement with UHAB has significance beyond the meaning it holds for the 
individuals it covers. 126  By offering a framework rooted in cooperative 
governance, the agreement memorializes community-based ideas of shared effort 
that former squatters lived out informally since the 1970s, while they occupied 
and rehabilitated what were, at times, dangerously substandard structures. The 
community-enhancing norms of collective ownership and democratic 
governance incorporated into housing development fund companies contribute 
to both the legal and social meaning of the agreement by illuminating the 
relationship between rules governing property and community-driven initiative 
and investment. 
IV. A Museum for a Movement: Reclaiming Meaning for Abandoned Urban 
Space 
Housed in the cramped main floor and basement of a refurbished Lower 
East Side tenement building, the Museum of Reclaimed Urban Space (MORUS) 
opened in December 2012, just weeks after Superstorm Sandy had surged over 
large swaths of the floodplain where the Lower East Side sits. The Museum was 
itself a victim of water damage that delayed its opening.127 Billed as an “archive 
of the unthinkable,”128 MORUS is dedicated to preserving the history of the 
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community gardens, squatting, and bicycle advocacy environmentalism 
movements.129  
The Museum’s host building, located on Avenue C, and popularly known as 
“See Sqwat,” is one of the eleven buildings covered under the City’s 2002 
agreement with UHAB.130 Long identified as a “punk squat,” See Sqwat housed 
a mosh pit and space in one portion of the basement for band performances.131 
Longtime residents recall a time when the building lacked stairs, leading 
residents to use netting to hoist themselves up to their apartments, a procedure 
likened to “scaling the rigging of an old sailing ship.”132 See Sqwat residents are 
among the cohort of volunteers who have built the Museum.133 
Leading walking tours and workshops, and using photographs, community 
newspapers, and other material artifacts of place-based activism, MORUS offers 
perspectives on how the community gardens, squatting, and bicycle advocacy 
environmentalism movements helped reclaim Lower East Side properties from 
abandonment and disinvestment in the 1970s and from the City’s later efforts to 
sell off the properties for redevelopment.134 The Museum’s programming seeks 
to connect the neighborhood’s history of activism with the principle of 
sustainability, particularly as local community groups have found new uses for 
the neighborhood’s abandoned lots,135 uses that transformed Avenue C (and 
environs) from the “lunar landscape” it had come to resemble in 1980.136  
As one commentator has noted, MORUS documents “defiant direct action 
designed to rebuild a city out of the rubble of a fiscal crisis and planned 
shrinkage.”137 In preserving a record of art interventions and arrests, lawsuits 
and garden occupations, MORUS also offers interpretation, drawing meaning 
from the acts of landlords, City officials, and the community initiatives that 
reclaimed ravaged and abandoned spaces and reintegrated them as community 
spaces. The narrative that MORUS tells makes clear that these initiatives 
sometimes entailed property outlawry, but it also offers a critical view of 
property rules and government policies, inviting consideration of inequity that 
may inhere in those rules and policies.   
In the first anniversary edition of the MORUS opening catalogue, a 
contributor recalled how the activists that MORUS memorialized “transformed 
a material and political landscape with our ideals of how things could be.”138 
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That insight—that the act of reclaiming is also transformative—is part of the 
essential meaning that the users, owners, and regulators of reintegrated spaces 
will draw from this history. 
